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Abstract: The compromise in Moscow essentially followed the lines roughed out 
by the State Secretary. Even if he was aware of the magnitude of the concessions 
he had to make, especially in Eastern Europe, he was equally convinced that the 
end result – the restoration of US-Soviet relations – was to be perceived, even by 
his critics at home as a great breakthrough. Byrnes greatly overestimated his 
ability to generate a consensus in support of the Moscow agreements. The issues of 
Eastern Europe and the extended Middle East, exactly those where he took a step 
back or chose to neglect, would in the following months lead to a consensus, only 
not the one he was seeking.
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The Moscow Tripartite Conference of December 1945 has been rightly 
seen as a crucial point in the outbreak of the Cold War. It is nonetheless a paradox 
that a high level meeting which ended in compromise on many points also 
deepened the fractures separating the troubled Anglo-American partnership from 
their wartime ally. As we have demonstrated elsewhere1, US policy with regard to 
the composition of the Romanian and Bulgarian governments, a policy responsible 
for the stalemate at the London session of the Council of Foreign Ministers, was 
being gradually abandoned by State Secretary Byrnes starting with the last few 
days of September. 
 In the aftermath of the failure in London in September 1945 it was vital to 
restart the peace-making machinery. The London Council of Foreign Ministers had 
adjourned without the negotiators being able to agree on the path to follow with 
regard to the peace treaties with Germany’s ex-allies. Consequently, in Moscow 
both procedural and substantive issues were at stake, although it was obvious for 
                                                
∗ PhD, Lecturer at the Faculty of History, University of Bucharest. Contact: matalvic@yahoo.co.uk. 
1 Alin-Victor Matei, “În cutarea compromisului: relaiile interaliate sub impactul eecului 
Conferinei de la Londra (septembrie-decembrie 1945)”, in Laureniu Constantiniu (ed.), In 
Memoriam Acad. Florin Constantiniu. Smerenie. Pasiune. Credin, Bucureti, Editura 
Enciclopedic, 2013, pp. 421-449. 
/%1E	<=	

8 
some of the contemporaries that the procedural debates were part of the Soviet 
power play. Soviet refusal to allow peace-making to continue was thus a brutal but 
effective way to pressure the Anglo-Americans into accepting the pro-Soviet 
governments in Romania and Bulgaria.  
Part of the difficulty however resided in the way American foreign policy 
was constructed. While Britain had already determined to keep a low profile in the 
conflict surrounding the composition of the governments on Bucharest and Sofia 
and had concluded that the only chance to limit Soviet influence in that region was 
to conclude the peace treaties as fast was possible, US policy had veered towards a 
more confrontational stance. The latter was not necessarily the result of a fledgling 
consensus in Washington regarding the way to approach the emerging Soviet 
sphere of influence but rather the result of the somewhat chaotic Soviet policy of 
the State Secretary Byrnes. He had come to London determined to instrumentalize 
the peace treaties and thus limit Soviet influence on the post-war evolution of 
Germany’s former allies. Byrnes had been right to consider the peace treaties as 
the most powerful means at his disposal, but his determination did not survive the 
several rough meetings with Molotov and by the end of the session he had already 
effectively abandoned the policy of resistance and offered a way out of the 
stalemate which preserved the Soviet position in Romania and Bulgaria while 
providing the US the meagre possibility to save face.  
This abrupt change in policy was partially and deliberately obscured by the 
State Secretary who saw himself congratulated instead for his support of a 
principled foreign policy. In that he was assisted by the Soviets who refused to 
acknowledge the massive concessions. Choosing to concede to the Soviets in 
Eastern Europe, Byrnes was nonetheless distancing himself from the public image 
of his behaviour in London. 
Prolonging the stalemate could permanently damage inter-Allied relations 
and this simple conclusion was the main impetus to organizing a new conference 
of the three foreign ministers, this one outside the institutional framework laid out 
at Potsdam. It was to be an almost informal reunion, far from the eyes of the 
American press, offering the perspective of gaining direct access to Stalin. It was 
to be an opportunity for personal diplomacy, in line with Byrnes’ expectation to act 
with as little interference as possible from the President or the State Department 
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bureaucracy. The downside of course was that there was no one else to share 
responsibility with in case of failure2. 
The US domestic politics were influencing heavily the policies Byrnes was 
following in Moscow with regard to the governments in Romania and Bulgaria, the 
issue of atomic energy or the Far East. First of all he intended to follow a strictly 
personal policy, one avoiding presidential control or any influence admiral Leahy, 
the president’s chief of staff, could exercise as the latter had done under 
Roosevelt3. Both in style and intention, Byrnes managed to antagonize most of the 
career diplomats. Suspicion was mutual and many of his subordinates were hostile 
to any substantial change in US policy towards the Soviet Union when compared 
to the approach taken in London. Kennan could be scathing in his criticism4. 
Under the circumstances, the form the compromise would take was even 
more important from Byrnes’ point of view because it essence was a de facto
acceptance of the Soviet position in exchange for the doubtful promise of 
organizing free elections in the near future, especially in Romania. Even a 
satisfactory face-saving formula was difficult to obtain since for the Kremlin 
language was equally important. Turning nominal concessions into real advantages 
for the Anglo-Americans and the democratic forces in Romania and Bulgaria could 
result at best in a protracted political crisis in Bucharest and Sofia. 
The Moscow conversations with regard to the recognition of the Romanian 
and Bulgarian governments started on 18 December with an unconvincing attempt 
to use the Ethridge report to put pressure on the Soviets. Its obvious lack of 
effectiveness in this first informal meeting with Molotov5 means that Byrnes’ 
attempt can be considered part of the epilogue to the policy he had followed during 
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the first phase of the London Conference. It was however more than that. Given 
the evolution in the Secretary of State’s thinking since the end of September it is 
more likely that the Ethridge report was now used not to bring about an extensive 
change in Soviet policy but to pressurize Moscow into accepting a compromise in 
form. Moreover, the State Secretary was coming around to a point of view which 
he and the State Department had repeatedly refuted throughout the summer of 
1945 in their conversations with the British. The aim was now to negotiate the 
peace treaties as fast as possible so as to create the conditions for a withdrawal of 
the Red Army and a gradual improvement of the political development of the 
concerned states6. It is difficult to say if this new strategy was more than a simple 
pretext used to justify what some in the administration, Congress or the public 
opinion might have viewed as a drastic transformation of a policy dating back to 
the refusal to recognize the newly installed Groza government. 
Byrnes’ tactics with regard to the composition of the Romanian and 
Bulgarian governments were also different when compared to the London CFM. If 
in London he had been the one offering solutions and these varied from a radical 
reorganization of the two governments and Groza’s resignation to the simple 
inclusion of a few democratic politicians, in London he would constantly aim to 
force the Soviets to come with the solution themselves. First of all, however, he 
had to signal that his own attitude was changing. In that first informal meeting with 
Molotov on December 18 Byrnes drew attention to the Ethridge report which 
seemed to confirm his reasons for refusing the recognition of the two governments. 
At the same time, he confessed to Molotov that he had decided not to publish the 
report yet and that he expected the Soviet side to help him break the stalemate. 
Although there is no doubt that the States Secretary could have used the 
Ethridge report in a  more forceful way, he also doubted that such a course would 
have led to any positive results. Instead, he was effectively telling the Soviet 
commissar that there could be trouble ahead in the Soviet-American relationship 
and that there was considerable flexibility in the American position. Publishing the 
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highly critical report7 would have made a compromise impossible in the absence of 
massive Soviet concessions. Refusing to publish for the moment the report seemed 
to offer only advantages: presenting it informally during the Conference could 
make the Soviets a little more flexible. On the contrary, in the case of a failure in 
Moscow, publication would provide the most solid defence for the Secretary of 
State’s policy. Byrnes’ intention to use the document to advance his personal 
policy meant that few other persons had read it. The Secretary of State had not 
informed the President of its content, while London, despite the British diplomats’ 
in Bucharest and Sofia cooperation with Ethridge8, knew only what they and Clark 
Ker in Moscow had reported. Thus, on December 18, after being provided with a 
partial translation of the document, the Soviets knew more about it than either 
Truman or Bevin. 
Byrnes needed a lot more than the Ethridge report to put Molotov on the 
defensive. By the time when on December 19 Byrnes proposed the withdrawal of 
Allied troops from Austria9 (the request was significant since the Soviets 
constantly used the necessity of keeping lines of communication with the Soviet 
troops in Austria to justify for the massive presence of Red Army troops in 
Romania and Hungary), the Soviets had already adopted an obstructive stance on 
the issue of the Council of Foreign Ministers’ structure, had brought forth the 
presence of American troops in China and of the British troops in Greece and even 
Indonesia, had declined to discuss atomic energy, all in a successful attempt to 
counter American pressure. It was obvious that the Soviet representatives had no 
intention to answer Byrnes’ pleas and present their own plan for a compromise. 
Consequently, on 20 December, during the fifth formal meeting, the US 
delegation presented two documents establishing conditions for the recognition of 
the Romanian and Bulgarian governments. Both had to be reorganized by 
integrating representatives of the main democratic parties10. The restructured 
                                                
7 See the text of the Ethridge report, included the somewhat diluted part destined for publication, in 
Foreign Relations of the United States, 1945. Volume V. Europe (hereafter FRUS 1945 V), 
Washington, United States Government Printing Office, 1967, pp. 633-642. For the very critical 
remarks relating to Soviet policy in the area see page 637.  
8 P. Ward, The Threat of Peace: James F. Byrnes and the Council of Foreign Ministers 1945-1951, 
Kent, Kent University Press, 1979, p. 63. 
9
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governments would organize elections as soon as possible based on a new electoral 
law, the ministries responsible for the elections being depoliticized11. The 
American projects were thus following most of the recommendations made by 
Ethridge in mid-November, in a context in which it had already become clear that 
the elections in Bulgaria would not be delayed12. 
The US proposals and the exchanges that followed during the plenary 
meeting on December 22 resembled many of the conversations in London. It is 
unlikely however that even Byrnes took them seriously since they relied on the 
highly unlikely possibility that the Soviets would practically pass over the results 
of the rigged elections in Bulgaria in order to bring the opposition back into 
government. Molotov made it extremely clear: the US documents were 
“unacceptable”13. There was no longer a political crisis in Bulgaria and the one in 
Romania was entirely artificial, the result of outside intervention. On the contrary, 
the latest developments in Bulgaria should have guaranteed the diplomatic 
recognition of the government in Sofia. Moreover, the Soviet commissar reverted 
to one of his favourite themes: why was there no Ethridge mission in Greece? Why 
was Romania so different from Greece?14 In an ironic twist which must have 
seemed grotesque to those present, Molotov finished his defence by declaring that 
any tripartite solution would mean meddling into the affairs of the two states which 
was contrary to the Yalta Declaration of Liberated Europe. 
In the midst of this charged atmosphere Molotov offered the first clues to a 
possible settlement. Even if the Soviet government could not accept under any 
circumstances to cancel the results of the Bulgarian elections, it was still possible 
that Romania would not object to including one or two apolitical personalities if 
the three powers agreed to sign the peace treaty as soon as possible. Romania 
could also be advised to organize elections based on a new electoral law15. As for 
depoliticizing the Interior Ministry, this would have represented an unjustified 
interference in Romanian domestic affairs and would “undermine the authority of 
                                                                                                                                      
from the National Liberal Party and the National Peasant Party (the document explicitly excluded 
Maniu, Brtianu and Lupu given the negative reaction of Molotov in London). 
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 FRUS 1945 II, pp. 700-702. 
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 Foreign Relations of the United States, 1945. Volume IV. Europe (hereafter FRUS 1945 IV), 
Washington, United States Government Printing Office, 1968, pp. 377-378. 
13
 Documents on British Policy Overseas. Conferences and Conversations 1945, Series I. Volume 2
(hereafter DBPO I 2), London, Her Majesty’s Stationery Office, 1986, p. 825. 
14
 FRUS 1945 II, pp. 728-730; DBPO I 2, pp. 825-827. 
15
 FRUS 1945 II, pp. 731-733. 
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the King”16. Molotov was now becoming the main defender of the Romanian 
monarchy! 
Despite the fact that the two delegations seemed to be as far apart as at any 
time in the previous negotiations, the 22 December meeting brought the first step 
toward a compromise: the Soviet side had accepted the principle of government 
enlargement for Romania and this allowed the State Secretary to build on it to 
create the appearance of a compromise, even if the Soviet concession was likely to 
be again symbolic. 
The next day Byrnes’ expectations regarding the usefulness of direct 
conversations with Stalin seemed to be fulfilled. Although he proved as immune 
and ironic when confronted with the Ethridge report, going as far as to suggest that 
the Soviet Union could at any time send someone like Ehrenburg to write another 
impartial report on conditions in Romania17, Stalin seemed willing to pose as more 
moderate than his Foreign Minister. Byrnes’ perseverance paid off and Stalin went 
a step further in accepting to advise the Bulgarians to include a few members of 
the “loyal opposition” into the government. Furthermore, Soviet position with 
regard to Romania seemed to be changing. Stalin accepted that the Romanian 
government had to be enlarged by including members of the liberal and peasant 
parties although Maniu, Brtianu or Lupu were unacceptable and those selected 
had to be “loyal”. 
The Soviet leader had just offered the concessions Byrnes needed back 
home. All that was left was to find the method used to implement the decision and 
in fact the two needed only a few minutes to agree on the creation of a tripartite 
commission which would go to Bucharest and assist the Romanian political forces 
in the “reorganization” of the government. As for Bulgaria, the commission would 
be replaced by the “friendly counsel” of the Soviet Union18. 
The agreement on the structure of the Romanian and Bulgarian 
governments was a purely Soviet-American affair, although Byrnes’ desire to 
exclude the British was reinforced by the low profile policy that Britain had been 
following in South-Eastern Europe since the crisis in US-Soviet relations caused 
by the Groza government. To this one must add Britain’s reluctance to engage in a 
diplomatic conflict in Romania and Bulgaria at a time when the focus of Anglo-
                                                
16
 DBPO I 2, p. 831. 
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 FRUS 1945 II, pp. 752-753. 
18
Ibidem, pp. 754-756. 
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Soviet tensions seemed to be moving towards the Middle East. Moreover, 
notwithstanding the lack of resources which discouraged and independent British 
policy in the Balkans, the policy now advocated by the US State Secretary was 
identical to the one the Foreign Office had been putting forward since Potsdam. In 
fact, while the Secretary of State was having talks with Stalin, the US delegation 
received a short message from Ernest Bevin outlining briefly his views on a 
possible solution. The conclusions closely matched those of the State Secretary19. 
The remaining differences were hammered out over the next few days, 
although even this very limited negotiation proved to be very strenuous. On 
December 24 both the US and Soviet delegations put forward draft agreements 
which closely mirrored the views expressed by Stalin and Byrnes the previous 
evening20. 
The US stance had evolved considerably over the past several days. Most 
of the guarantees required to ensure free elections had been abandoned. More 
important – and predictable – the US delegation had given up demanding new 
elections in Bulgaria. Despite these significant changes, there remained perceptible 
differences between the two sets of documents, although their practical importance 
was doubtful. The laborious negotiations that followed could only demonstrate the 
degree to which Soviet concessions were insignificant and yet extremely 
reluctantly offered. One such example was the loyalty criterion required by the 
Soviet side to establish which politicians could or could not be included in the two 
governments. Even more revealing for the techniques the Soviets were using in 
Bucharest was the formula “1-2 loyal representatives, in relations to the present 
Government, of groups of National-Peasant and Liberal parties (not including 
Maniu, Brtianu, Lupu) which are not participating at the present time in the 
Government”21. According to this interpretation, it was possible to designate 
members of the dissident groups that had broken away from the two democratic 
parties and had effectively become fellow travellers of the Romanian communists. 
It seemed that the less significant the stake the more intense the debates 
became. Christmas Day was spent by Molotov, Byrnes and Bevin arguing over the 
meaning of the word “loyal”, discussing the opportunity of qualifying 
“representative” with “truly” and the like. In fact, wording was crucial for Byrnes 
                                                
19
Ibidem, pp. 758-759. 
20 The US project in Ibidem, pp. 770-771; the Soviet ones in Ibidem, pp. 772-773. 
21
Ibidem, p. 773. 
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and his ability to submit successfully the agreement both to the American public 
and the main decision-makers. 
More significantly, there was the problem of the relationship between the 
government changes in Bucharest and Sofia and the international recognition of 
the two governments. For the Soviets the solution was straightforward and 
recognition would have followed immediately following the fulfilment of the 
agreement whereas the US draft only committed the US and British governments 
to review the issue of diplomatic recognition. The Soviet stance would prevail 
once more22. 
In the end, the arduous negotiations over the formal issues contrasted 
markedly with the ease with which Byrnes had given up on the guarantees for free 
elections present in the initial US draft. The debates over the inconsequential 
wording of the agreement was regarded with disgust by many in the US delegation, 
most of them being opposed to accepting Stalin’s concessions which they rightly 
saw as farcical. Reflecting later on the results of the Moscow conference, Kennan 
could not hide his contempt for the “absurd” belief that changing one or two 
ministers and mentioning some unconvincing diplomatic procedures could hide the 
nakedness of the Stalinist dictatorship23. Given the attitude of those surrounding 
him in Moscow, it is even more difficult to comprehend today the State Secretary’s 
belief in his ability to “sell” the agreement to the rest of the American 
administration and the general public. 
Despite the final favour of agreeing to include in the final communique the 
formulas commonly agreed upon but which the Soviet Secretariat of the 
Conference had conveniently forgotten to update24, Molotov confessed to being 
pleased with the results. In a conversation with the Romanian ambassador in 
Moscow, Iorgu Iordan, on December 27, the Romanian diplomat noticed that the 
Anglo-Americans had only been searching for a superficial exit from the crisis. 
Molotov agreed pointing out that there was to be no significant political change in 
                                                
22  Ibidem, pp. 768, 788-789. 
23 Averell Harriman, Elie Abel, op.cit., p. 525; Charles E. Bohlen, op.cit., p. 349; George F. 
Kennan, Memoirs (1925-1950), London, Hutchinson, 1968, pp. 284, 287-288. Kennan saw Byrnes 
as profoundly cynical, not at all interested in the real impact of an agreement he was pursuing 
solely for its domestic US benefits.  
24
 DBPO I 2, pp. 869-873; FRUS 1945 II, pp. 781-795, 813-814. 
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Bucharest25. As ambassador Harriman was to observe during his stay in the 
Romanian capital, the Soviets had absolutely no intention of accepting two popular 
and influential politicians from the democratic parties. The very negotiations 
surrounding the fulfilment of the Moscow agreement led him to believe the 
democratic parties would not have any chance in the coming elections26. 
Throughout the final months of the war and during the several months that 
followed VE Day the US had constantly overestimated its ability to influence 
developments in Eastern Europe. The Moscow Conference put an end to this trend 
From a certain perspective, Byrnes’ policy was as realistic as it could be: 
for both Romania and Bulgaria an inter-Allied agreement was unlikely to change 
the situation on the ground and the promise to organize free elections was the 
maximum that could be obtained. The advocates of this line of reasoning, be they 
contemporaries or historians, are right only up to a point. However, Byrnes’ 
negotiation behaviour does not fully support the thesis that his concessions were 
informed by the realization of the fact that even an unsatisfactory agreement was 
enough to lay the basis for a longer term strategy, one which included concluding 
peace treaties as fast as possible and could lead to a diminution of Soviet influence 
in Eastern Europe. Instead it is more likely that he saw the stalemate as a 
threatening the US-Soviet relationship in general and even his role as peacemaker. 
Byrnes’ options were first of all personal options, not supported by the experts of 
the relevant divisions inside the State Department or the American diplomats in the 
region concerned, the latter being deeply hostile to any compromise27. The 
isolation of the State Secretary should not obscure the fact that his dilemma was 
very real: how could the US-Soviet cooperation be preserved to a reasonable level 
when the very foundation of this cooperation seemed to be undermined by Soviet 
behaviour in Eastern Europe and elsewhere? 
Choosing such a policy left a multitude of questions unanswered: were the 
Soviets really intending to withdraw their troops? Could these states develop 
                                                
25 David R. Stone, “The 1945 Ethridge Mission to Bulgaria and Romania and the Origins of the 
Cold War in the Balkans”, Diplomacy & Statecraft, vol. 17, no. 1, 2006, p. 106. 
26
 Foreign Relations of the United States, 1946. Volume VI. Eastern Europe, the Soviet Union 
(hereafter FRUS 1946 VI), Washington, United States Government Printing Office, 1969, pp. 559-
560. 
27
 FRUS 1945 V, pp. 642-644; FRUS 1945 IV, pp. 410-412; Hugh de Santis, The Diplomacy of 
Silence: The American Foreign Service, the Soviet Union, and the Cold War, 1933-1947, Chicago, 
University of Chicago Press, 1983, pp. 163-164. 
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functional liberal regimes when the Soviet occupation was likely to leave behind 
what the diplomatic reports from the region already described as “police states”? 
Was it not that these concessions, justified by the simple fact that the United States 
and Britain could only afford a strategy with long term objectives in Europe, were 
in reality undermining these very objectives? 
Ambiguity was the dominant note. Byrnes must have understood the 
precariousness of the agreement and the fragility of the guarantees accepted, 
especially in the case of Romania where the Anglo-Americans had given up on 
their most powerful levers: the refusal to recognize the Groza government and the 
determination to make diplomatic recognition dependent on the organization of 
free elections28. Acknowledging the importance of this instrument, Harriman, now 
in Bucharest as part of the tripartite commission, believed that the United States 
were in no way committed to recognize the government resulting from the future 
elections if the latter were not properly organized29. In fact, such a threat was of 
little or no consequence once the diplomatic relations would be established. The 
ineffectiveness of this proposition was to be proved by the very way in which the 
Moscow settlement was implemented. While in Romania the tripartite commission 
turned out to be extremely useful – especially from the Soviet point of view – in 
convincing the democratic leaders and the King to accept the settlement and end 
the political crisis, in Bulgaria the democratic politicians refused these paltry 
concessions and implicitly their symbolic participation in the Fatherland Front 
government. As a consequence, the US government refused to recognize the 
Bulgarian regime until the autumn of 1947 without this having any effect on the 
Communization process in the country30. Inside the State Department itself 
reactions were mixed. While Acheson referred to Byrnes as “Saint Nicholas” 
                                                
28 Geir Lundestad, The American Non-Policy towards Eastern Europe, 1943-1947. Universalism in 
an Area Not of Essential Interest to the United States, Oslo, Universiteitsforlaget, 1975, pp. 245-
246. In his public statement on the Conference’s results Byrnes reverted to a theme already present 
in his pre-Conference speeches: the necessity to take into account the security interests of the Soviet 
Union. Thus, according to the State Secretary, the withdrawal of the Red Army was unlikely if the 
Soviet Union did not trust these governments. See A Decade of American Foreign Policy: Basic 
Documents, 1941-1949, Washington, United States Government Printing Office, 1950, p. 68. 
29
 FRUS 1946 VI, p. 557. 
30 Mark Ethridge, C. E. Black, “Negotiating on the Balkans, 1945-1947”, in Raymond Dennett, 
Joseph Johnson (eds.), Negotiating with the Russians, Boston, 1951, p. 203; Elizabeth W. Hazard, 
Cold War Crucible: United States Foreign Policy and the Conflict in Romania, 1943-1953, New 
York, Columbia University Press, 1996, pp. 143-144.
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bringing gifts from Moscow, US diplomats in Bucharest spoke of “betrayal” and 
thought about collective resignation31. 
Similar developments in Bulgaria and Romania were in the end an 
argument for the defence of the State Secretary’s actions in Moscow. The 
instrument of diplomatic recognition could only be effective if inter-Allied 
remained one of the priorities of Soviet foreign policy and this involved 
maintaining a certain degree of consensus in Eastern Europe. The worsening of 
inter-Allied relations and the Soviet policy’s slide towards unilateralism meant that 
the perspective of continuing cooperation lost any of its potential moderating 
influence on Soviet behaviour. Implementing any policy regarded by the Soviets as 
contrary to their vital interests would have required the threat or the actual use of 
force. In defence of the State Secretary it must be said that a similar strategy 
seemed to be bearing fruit in Hungary. The announcement of diplomatic 
recognition of the government in Budapest was followed by municipal and 
legislative elections in conditions deemed acceptable in the West. 
From a certain perspective, peace treaties were really important if they 
could have an impact on the political development of Romania in Bulgaria via a 
transformation of their relationship with the USSR. The Soviet side could not 
abandon the gains it had already made with the armistice conventions and could 
not allow the diplomatic debates surrounding the peace treaties weaken it hold on 
East European countries. The defeat in Moscow of the US attempts to use the 
peace treaties to influence the political struggle in Eastern Europe meant that many 
of the arguments surrounding the East European peace treaties lost their relevance. 
The treaty with Italy moved to the forefront accordingly. 
The Limits of Compromise 
 Byrnes gave up in Moscow what he did not have. Geographical proximity 
and their presence on the ground provided the Soviets with a decisive advantage. 
Notwithstanding this simple observation, Byrnes’ exercise in rooseveltian 
realpolitik was clearly at odds with the principles of the Atlantic Charter and other 
documents to which the US had subscribed. After the Moscow Conference, the 
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Secretary of State had to confront a President who has been finally able to read the 
Ethridge report and a Congress more and more willing to find for itself a role in 
foreign policy-making in the post-war era. Equally important, Byrnes’ aloofness 
from his own Department encouraged many diplomats to build an alternative 
image of the Soviet intentions, one that was considerably more pessimistic about 
Kremlin’s policies in Eastern Europe, Iran, the Mediterranean or Germany. 
 Trying to repeat the Yalta success that he witnessed first-hand, the State 
Secretary fell victim to the dictum that history never repeats itself32. The 
comparison with Yalta can be developed further. Roosevelt had sought Soviet 
cooperation in the Far East and in establishing the UN and had settled on a vague 
formula for the Polish government and the relationship between the USSR and 
Eastern Europe in general in order to avoid endangering the general agreement. 
The compromise had been almost entirely Soviet-American, and Roosevelt had 
deliberately and repeatedly dissociated himself from the British. The British, 
although still enjoying considerable influence, had proved unable to give more 
substance to the Polish settlement. In Moscow, Byrnes fulfilled most of his Far 
Eastern aims and attempted to ensure that the Soviets would cooperate with the 
American multilateral projects (the UN commission for atomic energy, a peace 
conference with large participation). In exchange, he basically accepted the Soviet 
point of view in Eastern Europe and neglected British appeals for support on the 
Iranian issue. 
 Byrnes could declare himself satisfied for obtaining everything he aimed 
for in China, Japan or Korea or in setting up an international regime for the control 
of atomic energy thinking that the concessions in Eastern Europe were more 
apparent than real. Roosevelt too had believed at the time at Yalta that there was 
not much that could be done against the Soviets in Eastern Europe. Byrnes’ 
compromise however was not politically sustainable. He had done nothing to build 
a consensus inside the administration favourable to making those concessions, he 
failed to appreciate immediately the importance of the Iranian issue, he attracted 
the hostility of the most important republicans in Congress influential in foreign 
policy-making and managed to bring Anglo-American relations to their lowest 
point since December 194133. In some ways this state of affairs was paradoxical 
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since Byrnes’ policies in Eastern Europe was actually closer to the British 
officials’ thinking than to that of the State Department experts. 
 In the end, Truman was correct to describe the Moscow successes as “not 
real”34, although this evaluation present in his memoirs was no doubt coloured by 
subsequent experiences. Truman was right in more than one sense since the 
agreements on Japan, Korea or atomic energy were focused on establishing a 
general framework for inter-Allied cooperation but did not detail the policies to be 
implemented. The exclusion of the Iranian issue from the final communique 
combined with the State Secretary’s failure to better explain his East European 
policy completed the picture. Byrnes was also the heir of rooseveltian ambiguity 
with regard to Eastern Europe and ultimately his main strategy was to preserve that 
ambiguity as much as possible 
 From a Soviet point of view, the reunion had been a remarkable success. 
The decisions vis-à-vis the Far East, if strictly interpreted, seemed to ensure a more 
than formal role for Soviet representatives in Japan. The Soviet position in China 
and Korea had been preserved, even if the Soviet delegation could not demand 
forcefully the withdrawal of US troops from northern China for the simple reason 
that it would have weakened its negotiation strategy in Iran and Eastern Europe. 
Soviet demands in the Straits and the Mediterranean had been restated. A delayed 
decision on Iran meant more time to use the Red Army for political and economic 
advantage. The setting up of the Atomic Energy Commission did not translate into 
political advantages for the American side. The participation to the mechanisms for 
negotiating the peace treaties was kept as restricted as possible. The conference 
and the preparatory activity had also revealed that a correct mixture of firmness 
and concessions could force apart with relative ease the Anglo-Americans. Finally 
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– and most importantly – US activism in Eastern Europe had been countered and 
the Moscow Conference provided the Soviets with a way out of their Romanian 
dilemma by putting an end to the political crisis in Bucharest without the need for 
the Soviet Union and the local communists to adopt an even more confrontational 
stance towards the King and the democratic parties.
 Observing closely the developments in Moscow and having almost daily 
conversations with Bevin and Byrnes, the French ambassador, general Catroux, 
concluded on the last day of 1945: “It is beyond doubt that at this conference […] 
the Soviets were the main beneficiaries”35. 
 In London however reflecting on the Moscow Conference gave no reason 
for satisfaction. If Byrnes’ attitudes had not been remarkably consistent throughout 
the meeting, he had persevered on the contrary in neglecting the British interests 
and points of view. Even the members of the US delegation were troubled by the 
ease with which the Secretary was passing over British sensibilities: he presented 
the draft for the international control of atomic energy ahead of the schedule 
agreed upon with Bevin, he decided not to provide the British with a copy of the 
Ethridge report, he supported Molotov’s request to exclude India from the future 
peace conference and – worrying for Bevin – failed to give any coherent support 
on Iran. Bohlen and Harriman went as far as apologizing for the behaviour of the 
State Secretary which they attributed to inexperience and try to reassure their 
British counterparts that this was not part of a deliberate US policy36. Isaiah Berlin, 
himself a member of the British delegation, found out from Kennan and other 
American officials about their attempts to convince Byrnes to change policy. 
Kennan even expressed the hope that Bevin would try to confront the State 
Secretary37. 
 The failure to recreate the intimacy which had often characterized Anglo-
American relations during the war had been predictable from the very way Byrnes 
organized the Moscow reunion. Several British aims remained unfulfilled. While 
the compromise on Eastern Europe, on the resumption of the work of the CFM and 
the form the future conference of peace would take was considered by most in 
British decision-making circles as the best obtainable, this was entirely eclipsed by 
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the manifest failure to find a temporary solution for the Iranian problem or even 
the framework for reaching a settlement. Equally essential was the failure to 
mobilize US power in support of British policy in Iran. Also disturbing was the 
fact that there was nothing to show for the much anticipated discussions with 
Stalin “with the cards on the table”. Lacking American support, Bevin simply did 
not have the clout to reduce the gap between verbal assurances Stalin and Molotov 
offered and Soviet actions on the ground. Said differently, with the third player 
inactive, Stalin kept his cards close to his chest.
 The perceived weakness of Britain’s position and the inability to attract US 
assistance led the British officials to question the mechanism of the tripartite 
conferences. French ambassador in London Massigli could witness personally their 
despondency: the Moscow agreements were regarded as mediocre, too favourable 
for the Soviets, while Soviet refusal to discuss seriously Iran or Turkey had not 
diminished current threats to international peace38. 
 The Moscow Conference did result in the resumption of the peace treaty-
making activities and it thus achieved one of its original objectives. Of central 
importance however was the compromise over the composition of the Romanian 
and Bulgarian governments. In fact soon after the beginning of the second session 
of the CFM in Paris Molotov declared unceremoniously that he had no objection to 
French or Chinese participation to any of the negotiations taking place. In his 
memoirs Byrnes leaves the impression that he was fully aware of the drawbacks of 
the decision to convene a Conference of the Foreign Ministers in Moscow at the 
end of 194539. The compromise in Moscow essentially followed the lines roughed 
out by the State Secretary. Even if he was aware of the magnitude of the 
concessions he had to make, especially in Eastern Europe, he was equally 
convinced that the end result – the restoration of US-Soviet relations – was to be 
perceived, even by his critics at home as a great breakthrough, sufficiently 
important to justify his yielding to the Soviets on the fate of the Groza government. 
Byrnes greatly overestimated his ability to generate a consensus in support of the 
Moscow agreements. The issues of Eastern Europe and the extended Middle East, 
exactly those where he took a step back or chose to neglect, would in the following 
months lead to a consensus, only not the one he was seeking. 
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